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1. The political economy of agriculture in
Southern Africa
Elizabeth Ransom

INTRODUCTION
Agriculture remains the primary source of employment and income
for most of the rural populations of Southern Africa (Hachigonta et
al. 2013). When focusing on the political economy of agriculture and
food in the region, Europe and European legislation have played a
dominant role in both the past and the present. All the countries under
discussion were impacted by colonial rule, and at present there is a
significant disparity between commercial and smallholder agriculture.
While the disparity is one of the consequences of colonialism and South
African apartheid policies in the region, this disparity is exacerbated by
current European Union (EU) trade policies. With future challenges
related to climate change, combined with declining EU market access
and struggles to better integrate smallholders into income generating
activities, the Southern African region is in need of a new map with
which to navigate towards a future that ensures a vibrant agricultural
sector.
Defining the Scope
Depending upon the year and political organization one references, the
Southern Africa community consists of anywhere from five to fifteen
countries. For example, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) now considers fifteen countries as falling within the region.
However, the United Nations (UN) defines Southern Africa as consisting of five countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and
Swaziland (see Figure 1.1). For the purposes of this overview the following
discussion will largely be limited to the UN defined countries, although
with occasional references to other SADC countries.
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Figure 1.1

Map of Southern African countries

AGRICULTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE
PAST AND THE PRESENT: COMMON LINKAGES
Geography and climate play critical roles in shaping the agricultural landscape of the region. The average rainfall in Southern Africa is low, with
the least amount of rainfall occurring in the west (Namibia) and increasing
incrementally as one moves east (the eastern coast of South Africa and
portions of Swaziland and Lesotho receive the most). However, rainfall is
episodic and vast regions of Southern Africa experience regular droughts
(Hachigonta et al. 2013).
Rainfall is important because of the prevalence of rain-fed crops and
the role that livestock, particularly cattle, play in the region’s agricultural
system. For the vast majority of Africa, irrigation does not play a significant role in agriculture. A 2010 International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) report notes that “irrigated area as a share of total
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c ultivated area is estimated at only 6 percent for Africa, compared with 37
percent for Asia and 14 percent for Latin America” (You et al. 2010: 1).
Within Africa, the bulk of irrigation is actually located in Northern
Africa, whereas the only country in Southern Africa with approximately
1 million hectares irrigated is South Africa, and this represents less than
10 percent of agricultural lands within the country (You et al. 2010).
In sum, Southern African producers are highly dependent on rainfall
for growing crops. This dependency, when combined with weather patterns that are expected to become more erratic due to climate change
and increasing water needs for other economic sectors, will significantly
impact agricultural productivity in the future.
Rainfall also impacts the amount of grasses available for grazing cattle.
Historically, cattle populations have increased or declined based on the
amount of rainfall. For example, in Botswana the peak cattle population,
due to the availability of grass, has hovered around 3 million (in 1979
and 2002), with dramatic declines in cattle populations during periods of
drought (BIDPA 2006). Rainfall also affects the ability for farmers to rear
cattle using more intensive methods of production (feedlots as opposed to
pasture) due to limited availability of water for cattle and for growing the
crops used for cattle feed. Water constraints, in combination with cultural
traditions, have limited the number of producers in Southern Africa that
have adopted the industrial model of cattle farming.
In the past, and into the present, cattle have played a critical role in
Southern African agriculture. Scholars of Southern Africa history have
long been interested in exactly when domesticated livestock began to
appear in Southern Africa, because their appearance would signify a shift
from hunter-gathering societies to food producing societies. Cattle are
thought to have appeared in Southern Africa approximately 2,000 years
ago (Sadr 2013). Sadr (2013: 171) summarizes that many, including the
popular author Jarrod Diamond (1998), view this shift to food production
as a “first step towards the rise of economically, socially, and politically
more complex societies, and ultimately of civilization.” However, Sadr
counters that the archeological evidence is far from conclusive about
such grand results. He argues that the introduction of domesticated cattle
approximately 2,000 years ago does not correlate with significant changes
in other domains of material culture (Sadr 2013: 179). Regardless of when
hunters transitioned to pastoralists, the historical record does reveal that
cattle were crucial for obtaining wives among the Early Iron Age Bantu-
speaking farmers and herders (Sadr 2013). The multi-dimensional importance of cattle continues to this day for many indigenous ethnic groups in
Southern Africa.
Cattle as “a bank on hooves” is a phrase often used to describe the use
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of cattle by indigenous populations in Southern Africa. This phrase refers
to the fact that many smallholders view cattle as their investment, which
can be turned into cash as needed, in addition to providing fresh milk
for home consumption (see Schwalbach, Groenewald, and Marfo 2001;
Ferguson 1990). There is also the view that cattle ownership lends status or
prestige (i.e., the more cattle one owns the higher one’s status) and, as previously mentioned, is important for lobola (the negotiated number of cattle
a groom’s family gives to the bride’s family). The degree to which various
indigenous smallholders subscribe to the use of cattle as prestige, and for
the purposes of lobola, varies by ethnic group, geographical location (e.g.,
urban versus rural), and, based on the author’s own observations, socio-
economic status among people within the same community (e.g., those
with higher socio-economic status having the ability to purchase cattle;
also see, Schwalbach et al. 2001). However, the practice of keeping cattle
for cash-related reasons generally persists among most of the indigenous
ethnic groups in Southern Africa. A consequence of this is that while there
are large commercial cattle operations in South Africa, and to a lesser
extent Namibia and Botswana, the vast majority of cattle in Southern
Africa are located in smallholder, subsistence agricultural systems.
Despite the rather long history of cattle ownership and the social, cultural, and economic significance associated with cattle, the rise of colonialism in Southern Africa marked a period of removal of indigenous people
and their cattle from their lands. Indigenous Southern Africans were confined to a limited amount of land, also known as reserves, beginning in the
colonial period, which contributed to overcrowding. Depending upon the
government in power and the time period, little to no government support
for developing infrastructure or facilitating appropriate land management
occurred in the reserves,1 which when combined with overcrowded conditions further contributed to highly degraded soils.
As the region under discussion is diverse and involves different colonial
and post-colonial histories, it is beneficial to briefly review each country’s
agrifood sector. Common concerns across the five countries are then examined. Finally, the challenges for the future are discussed in the conclusion.

INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY AGRICULTURAL
OVERVIEWS
South Africa
Due to the sheer size of the economy, South Africa plays a dominant
role on the continent and in shaping the agricultural economies of the

The political economy of agriculture in Southern Africa  23
other countries in Southern Africa. South Africa is a major producer
of sugar, maize, dairy, chicken, grapes, apples, and beef among many
other commodities. South Africa is the only country in this region that
is currently capable of producing all its own basic foodstuffs (Agritrade
2011). The country also has a large food processing sector and a
number of well-developed export markets, with agriculture accounting
for 4.5 percent of GDP and the food processing sector accounting for an
additional 10 percent of GDP (Agritrade 2011). The size of both South
Africa’s economy and their population relative to the other nations means
that regional agricultural production and policy debates “take place in
the shadow” of South African dominance (Agritrade 2011: 1). South
Africa’s population represents 35 percent of the entire SADC region and
73 percent of GDP for the region (Hachigonta et al. 2013). In addition,
there are many historical linkages between South Africa and the larger
region, in particular in policies that encourage economic interdependency
and a demand for migrant laborers, especially for mining (Botha 2013;
O’Laughlin et al. 2013). Thus, all four of the other countries under consideration in this discussion are dependent on South Africa as an export
market for specific commodities (in the case of Lesotho, a primary export
to South Africa is water) and for imports of basic foodstuffs. Despite the
seemingly “successful” agricultural sector of South Africa, the sector has
been critiqued for the degree to which it has imitated the United States and
Canada in terms of its resource intensiveness and environmental degradation (Mather 1996). In addition, South Africa and Namibia share a post-
colonial agricultural history which contributes to both countries having
dual economies within the sector (see Lipton and Simkins 1993).
South Africa and Namibia each have a well-developed, predominantly
white commercial agricultural sector alongside an indigenous smallholder,
subsistence agriculture sector. The dual economies found within the agricultural sector are directly linked to past colonial and apartheid policies,
which among other things included removal of indigenous people from
much of the better agricultural lands and policies that “encouraged”
indigenous populations to seek work in formal, white-controlled, labor
markets. At present, reducing the dual economies to a minimum requires
land reform, as most smallholders suffer from insecure land tenure and/
or access to land that is inadequate in size or soil quality to allow them a
competitive advantage.
In the case of South Africa, land reform has largely been unsuccessful. The lack of success is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it is
important to note that in general, along with the significant social and
political changes that South Africans have experienced in the past two
decades, farmers were significantly impacted by economic liberalization
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policies. State support to farmers was dismantled and import tariffs
reduced in the 1990s, which left many farmers unable to compete with
farmers from developed countries in specific commodity markets, like
those for milk and wheat, but increased opportunities for some farmers in
other sectors, particularly high-value export markets, like citrus and game
meat (Goldblatt 2004). The social, cultural, and economic changes have
contributed to a significant decline in the number of farmers (31 percent
decrease, or 40,000 fewer farmers from 1993 to 2008) and farmworkers in
South Africa (1.6 million in 1971 to approximately 800,000 in 2007) and
an increase in concentration within the commercial agricultural sector
(Goldblatt 2004; O’Laughlin et al. 2013). Ultimately, larger, commercial
South African agricultural production may feed much of Southern Africa,
but it does so using industrial agricultural techniques that are resource
intensive (especially in terms of water) and without employing large tracts
of rural labor and, therefore, without providing an income source for the
large number of rural inhabitants in the region (O’Laughlin et al. 2013).
Namibia
The dual agricultural economy in Namibia is directly linked to the decimation of the indigenous populations under German rule and the imposition of South Africa’s governance, particularly apartheid policies. The
indigenous people of what is now known as Namibia, were first brutally
colonized by the Germans (1885–1915), and then controlled by South
Africa for more than 70 years, finally achieving independence in 1990.
Botha (2013) recounts that from the 1920s to the 1950s the South African
government was especially preoccupied with resettling whites onto lands,
which expanded upon resettlement practices that Germans had begun
prior to 1915. After the end of German rule, Botha claims that indigenous
Africans briefly hoped for the opportunity to become pastoralists again,
by restoring their herds and reclaiming access to land. However, South
Africa viewed indigenous African men as a ready labor supply for the
mines, thus local Africans’ hopes were short lived (Ibid.: 236). In addition, after 1950 South Africa began to counter previous German initiatives of mixed-farming operations and equitable water supplies (with the
goal of food self-sufficiency) and instead moved to the narrow pursuit of
“karakul or meat monocultures – heavily capitalised industrial ranches”
among white, commercial producers (Botha 2013: 234 citing Lau and
Reiner 1993: 58). Despite Namibia gaining independence in 1990, Botha
(2013: 249) observes that most indigenous communal farmers “continue
to be hamstrung by limited stock numbers, lack of quality grazing land,
inadequate support services and recurrent drought.”
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As of 2010 Namibian agriculture represented 7.4 percent of the overall
GDP, which includes fishing and hunting (AfDB 2012). Cattle remain one
of the most important sub-sectors within agriculture, but other significant
exports include fish, karakul sheep pelts, and live sheep to South Africa
(although the government regulates live sheep sales). Despite a few well-
developed commercial agricultural sub-sectors, the majority of population
in Namibia is rural and relies upon subsistence agriculture. The dual agricultural economy reflects, at least in part, the fact that Namibia, despite
being considered an upper middle-income country, is among the most
inequitable societies in the world in terms of income distribution (World
Bank 2014). In fact, along with Namibia, South Africa and Botswana
rank among the highest countries for average levels of development on the
African continent, but all three also have some of the highest rates of inequality (McKeever 2008).2 Thus, the Namibian government is interested
in trying to expand formal labor market opportunities in all sub-sectors of
the economy. In the case of agriculture, the government has focused on the
fishing industry (e.g., improved resource management) and redistribution
of lands for the purposes of resettling smallholders.
Botswana
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, in contrast to South Africa and
Namibia, can all be characterized as having primarily smallholder agriculture, and they all share the unique status of having been considered British
protectorates up until they gained independence from the British in the
1960s (thereby evading formal rule by South Africa and the imposition
of apartheid policies). However, similar to Namibia, a large percentage
of young indigenous men in all three countries have migrated out of rural
areas to find work in mining. Many of those mines are located in South
Africa, although mines exist throughout the region. Thus, rural areas
often became repositories of women, children, and the elderly, who lacked
steady incomes. Ferguson (1990), in his detailed study of Lesotho, also
argues that the cattle economy stayed strong in many of these rural spaces
because men working in the mines could buy cattle with their mine wages
and keep the cattle in their home spaces as a mechanism for securing their
money (ensuring it would not be spent while they were away) and as a way
of maintaining connections to their homes.
Botswana’s agricultural sector as a portion of GDP is quite small
(2.94 percent in 2012), but agriculture, particularly livestock farming,
remains an important activity for the purposes of diversifying the economy
(the bulk of Botswana’s GDP comes from mining). The agricultural sector
is also a source of jobs and food security in rural areas, and livestock
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 wnership is culturally highly valued. The dominant Tswana group (como
prising 79 percent of the population) is one of the ethnic groups in Southern
Africa that value cattle for social, cultural, and economic reasons.
Due to climate, Botswana is very limited in terms of the amount of
land that is suitable for crop production. At present crop production is
limited to 1 percent of a possible 5 percent of land suitable for cultivation (Zhou et al. 2013). This means that the vast majority of commodities
(e.g., maize, wheat, sorghum) are imported primarily from South Africa.
Cattle production is the only significant agricultural export commodity
for the country (Zhou et al. 2013: 52). In recent years the amount of beef
exported to Europe has steadily declined, and since 2010 it has experienced
periods of interruption due to European concerns over disease control and
lax enforcement of traceability requirements (Ransom 2011). Botswana is
unique in that the vast majority of cattle are reared on communal lands
(85 percent), and cattle reared in both communal and commercial production are exported (whereas in most Southern African countries only cattle
reared on commercial farms qualify for export). This unique aspect of the
industry has to do with longstanding government support for communal
production and an elaborate system of fences and traceability technology
put in place (with government funding) to meet the export criteria set by
European governments.
Lesotho
Agriculture accounts for about 10 percent of Lesotho’s GDP and is the
main source of employment in rural areas (Gwimbi et al. 2013). The
majority of the country lives in rural areas (82 percent), and 58 percent of
the population engaged in agriculture are female (World Bank 2013). The
majority of the population remains dependent on subsistence agriculture,
and there has been an uptick in droughts, which has increased food insecurity. It is estimated that Lesotho grows approximately 30 percent of its
own food (Gwimbi et al. 2013). The amount produced has declined over
the past several years, which is attributed to increasing number of people
settling on arable land near cities, erratic weather patterns, soil degradation, and declining productivity (e.g., due to lack of fertilizer) (Frenken
2005; Gwimbi et al. 2013). Part of the declining productivity has to do with
declining remittances from mine workers. Historically, people living in
rural areas have relied on remittances from men working in South African
mines to purchase inputs for farming (World Bank 2013). However, in
the past few decades remittances have declined due to a decline in mine
employment.
Cultivable land is limited to approximately 11 percent of the total area
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of the country, of which the most common crops are maize (60 percent),
sorghum (10–20 percent), wheat (10 percent) and beans (6 percent)
(Frenken 2005). Despite the popularity of growing maize, Lesotho must
import an estimated 65 percent of the population’s maize requirement and
80 percent of the population’s annual wheat requirements (Frenken 2005).
Livestock, particularly cattle, sheep, and goats, are prevalent, although
they primarily exist as part of subsistence agriculture, and cattle are considered a major contributor to land degradation in the country (Gwimbi
et al. 2013).
Water is considered Lesotho’s most important natural resource, but
the amount of rain received is erratic and scientists predict that water
resources will be increasingly scarce with climate change. Irrigation projects in Lesotho have long been a priority, but most projects over the past
40 years have not been successful. The lack of success has been attributed
to a “top-down and supply-driven approach on the part of government
and donors and little consultation with, or participation by, farmers”
(Frenken 2005: 303). Supposedly, the government is now pursuing irrigation projects that are “farmer-and market-led” and “based on small-scale
schemes provided for and managed by the farmers themselves” (Frenken
2005: 308).
Swaziland
Agriculture accounts for approximately 8.4 percent of Swaziland’s GDP
(Thwala 2011), with 70 percent of the labor force engaged in agriculture.
Unofficial unemployment is estimated at approximately 40 percent, and
it is even higher in rural areas (Manyatsi et al. 2013). Similar to Lesotho,
some of the rising unemployment is due to retrenchment in South African
labor mines.
Swaziland’s agricultural sector is bifurcated into a commercial, largely
export sector focused on sugarcane, citrus, and forestry and a large subsistence sector marked by declining productivity. As such the country
imports approximately 60 percent of all its food requirements, with
almost all the imports coming from South Africa (Manyatsi et al. 2013).
Sugarcane is the main export crop (95 percent of all sugarcane produced
is exported). Moreover, 85 percent of irrigated lands are dedicated to sugarcane (Manyatsi et al. 2013). The African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA)3 has been important for bolstering Swaziland’s apparel industry
and cotton production, which supplies the apparel industry. However,
cotton production declined significantly during the drought from 2002
to 2007, and currently not enough cotton is grown to support the apparel
sector – so cotton is imported (Manyatsi et al. 2013).
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Within subsistence agriculture, livestock is an important sub-sector.
Similar to Lesotho, Botswana, and portions of Namibia and South
Africa, cattle as a sub-sector is often associated with high stocking density,
overgrazing, and soil erosion (Thwala 2011). Unlike cattle, poultry are
viewed as primarily a women’s domain and they are viewed as providing
a much needed source of food.4 According to a report by Thwala (2011),
Swaziland does not import any broiler meat and eggs as the local production meets demand.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION: MARKET
ACCESS, SMALLHOLDERS, LAND TENURE, AND
GENDER
Market Access: Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations and the
EU Market
Since the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, Africa
has increasingly lost market share in Europe for their agrifood products
(Daviron 2008). Gibbon and Ponte (2005) argue that with the advent
of the WTO, developing countries lost some of their autonomy in trade
negotiations. Whereas previously developing countries were able to ask
for concessions in recognition of the qualitatively different challenges they
faced, current trade agreements do not allow for a recognition of qualitative differences between countries. Instead there is an assumption that
developing countries are simply at a “lower” stage of development and
need more time to implement the new requirements.
Part of the impact of the WTO on Southern Africa has been long-term
loss of preferential market access for specific goods (e.g., beef, sugar)
that was assured under the Lomé Convention, which was negotiated in
1975 between the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean, and
Pacific countries (Hurt 2012). Preferential access was deemed as not in
compliance with the WTO’s “no special and differential treatment” stipulation5 and the EU has moved to negotiating free trade agreements, or
what are called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Initially the
EU pursued regional EPA negotiations, but overtime more negotiations
have been occurring between individual countries. This approach has
been problematic for Southern Africa countries, in part because the EU
is attempting to negotiate for what are considered “behind the border”
issues, like “transparency in government procurement, national treatment
for foreign investors, and trade facilitation measures” (Hurt 2012: 502)6
– all items that developing countries resisted at the WTO Doha Rounds.
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In addition, Hurt (2012: 496) argues that the EPA negotiations in
Southern Africa are a means for the EU to “lock in” the neoliberal development model and thus advance the EU’s hegemonic position within the
region. This is taking place by limiting the policy options available to
developing countries’ governments for pursuing their own development.
Finally, the EPA negotiations are said to be potentially undermining the
political legitimacy of several Southern African political and economic
organizations, including SADC and the Southern Africa Customs Union
(SACU). This is because many of the EPA negotiations between individual African countries and the EU are contradictory to existing SADC
and SACU agreements, thereby challenging the continuing legitimacy of
these organizations (Hurt 2012). Many leaders in the Southern African
region believe a regional approach is needed to tackle complex social and
economic problems that are beyond the abilities of any one nation-state
(e.g., increasing food security, reducing unemployment through the promotion of wildlife tourism, tackling HIV/AIDS) (McKeever 2008). It is
within this framework that the potentially negative consequences of EU
EPA negotiations which directly contradict regional institutional agreements must be understood.
Increasingly, some “behind the borders” issues built into the EPAs
that shape agricultural production in Southern Africa focus on technical specifications, for example related to animal welfare and traceability
policies. The increasing focus on technical specifications has contributed
to mounting pressure on smallholder agriculture. The pressure on smallholders occurs because many technical specifications favor systems of
production already in place among larger, commercial producers, and/or
due to economies of scale, smallholder agriculturalists cannot afford to
implement new specifications as dictated by the EU (see Ransom 2011). In
combination with economic policies that have pushed for market deregulation in the region, smallholders exist in a production environment that
is extremely competitive, and those wishing to expand generally exist in a
hostile environment (Lahiff and Cousins 2005: 127).7
Smallholders
In all five countries under examination here, there is a preponderance
of smallholder agriculture. The percentage of the population that can
be identified as smallholders varies widely between countries, with an
estimated 61 percent of producers being smallholders within the broader
SADC community (SADC 2008). Despite significant efforts on the part
of governments and technical experts (e.g., economists, agricultural scientists) to reduce smallholder agriculture and encourage more market
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integration, smallholders remain important throughout the region in that
they provide household food security and rural employment, and more
generally provide buffers against periods of economic downturns (Bayer,
von Lossau, and Feldmann 2003). Many studies have focused on smallholder agriculture in Africa (Collier and Dercon 2014; Jayne, Mather,
and Mghenyi 2010), though not all have focused on the countries in this
analysis. Nonetheless, the themes and issues that emerge inform debates
and policies for this region.
First, despite the label, smallholders represent a diverse group, with some
evidence of growing disparities between smallholders in terms of land and
asset holdings (see Jayne et al. 2010). In the case of Botswana, it appears
that cattle ownership is increasingly concentrated among a small number
of communal farmers (Ransom 2011).8 Second, the productivity levels of
smallholders are highly variable. In all five countries under consideration,
smallholders are usually dependent on other forms of income (e.g., remittances, state welfare). Thus, if these forms of income decline, there is generally a decline in the inputs smallholders are able to purchase (e.g., fertilizer),
which can impact productivity. All smallholders throughout the region are
also highly vulnerable to climatic shocks, particularly drought. In the case
of livestock ownership, this usually means many cattle are sold off at lower
prices during periods of drought. Finally, smallholders are increasingly
vulnerable to what Jayne et al. (2010) refer to as governance issues. This
includes declining donor support for smallholders, as well as economic trade
agreements that disadvantage smallholders, and land tenure policies. In
conclusion, Jayne et al. (2010: 1394) argue, “most small farms in Africa are
becoming increasingly unviable as sustainable economic and social units.
Unless government policy is changed radically, the world may see increasingly frequent and severe economic and social crises in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
Land Tenure and Reform
As previously noted, land tenure issues tend to go hand-in-hand with
smallholder agriculture. South Africa and Namibia are both countries
formally grappling with the issue of land redistribution. In South Africa,
as of 2000, Black South Africans comprised 75 percent of the population,
but were limited to 13 percent of the land, which comprised the former
homelands. As of 2004, land reform in South Africa had managed to only
transfer an additional 2.9 percent of total agricultural land outside of
the former homelands (Lahiff and Cousins 2005). Similarly, in Namibia
land reform has been slow and heavily criticized. For example, in 2013
the Namibian government announced that 345 farms have been acquired
since 1991 for a grand total of 2.4 million hectares, and 5,000 families have
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Table 1.1 Land distribution in Southern Africa as a percentage of total
land

Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland
Source:

Individual tenure

Communal lands

5
5
44
72
40

70
90
41
14
60

Other public lands
25
5
15
14
0

Adapted from Garcia (2004).

been resettled on these farms (Immanuel 2013). While the government
viewed these efforts as a sign of progress, many question the likelihood
of agricultural success in the context of increasingly competitive and
concentrated global agricultural markets. The questionable likelihood of
success is due to the small farm size relative to the harsh environment that
these families are being settled upon. The dry environment means that the
number of animals that can be supported on approximately 450 hectares
is low. In addition, the amount of technological support and agricultural
extension many of these newly resettled farmers will need to farm successfully is viewed as largely lacking.
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have to contend with issues of land
reform, but for significantly different reasons. These three countries have
an abundance of smallholders situated on communal lands, as opposed
to land owned privately. Table 1.1 provides a comparison of communally
owned lands in contrast to privately owned lands. All five of the countries
in this analysis have debated the role of communal lands, but Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland’s governments have received significantly more
pressure (by outside donor agencies and development experts) to consider
privatizing communal lands. For example, there is growing pressure from
outside experts for Swaziland to implement land reform. Population pressures, increasing water scarcity, and rising poverty rates are all contributing to academics and donor institutions, like the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), recommending privatization so that smallholders have
incentives for improving the land (e.g., installing irrigation systems) (see
IRIN 2013). Generally, there are many reasons for encouraging privatization of communal lands across the region, but the most common reasons
include arguments for increasing the productivity of agriculture and the
belief that communal lands suffer from higher rates of land degradation
relative to privately held lands.
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Land reform and redistribution is a complex topic, which demands
contextual specificity within Southern Africa. Nonetheless, a few overarching points can be made. First, reform of communal lands needs to
pay special attention to the legal status and economic activities of women
and the poor, as they are the ones who disproportionally depend upon the
commons (Adams 2003; Wily 2011). Moreover, in this era of global land
grabs and corporate consolidation of agriculture, Wily (2011) argues that
the weak legal status of communal rights allows national governments to
take undue liberties with their citizens’ lands, which is another reason that
government land reform activities demand scrutiny.
Finally, low agricultural productivity and environmental concerns are
very real for many in Southern Africa, but land reform has often been used
as a means to try and insert pastoralists into formal legal systems of land
tenure. Specifically, support for land reform often rests on an assumption
that pastoralists do not fit within the dominant economic, legal, and scientific paradigms of global agriculture. Building on the work of Douglas
North (1990), Galaty (2013: 477) observes that communal “systems of
tenure are undergoing formalization, with various parties gaining legal
rights to land long held by pastoral societies, whether the state, local elites,
foreign companies, conservation entities or communities themselves.”
Many economists, public policy officials, and scholars believe formalization of land tenure arrangements is a prerequisite for increasing economic
efficiency (Galaty 2013), though this belief is not fully supported by the
existing data. For example, Feeny et al. (1990) argue that evidence gathered over a 22 year period (1968–1990) reveals that private, state, or communal property are all potentially viable resource management options.
Rather, a more complete theory of land tenure should incorporate institutional arrangements and cultural factors to provide for better analysis and
prediction of effective resource management. Despite the counterevidence,
the dominant belief of economic efficiency being gained through privatization means that land tenure reform that targets communal lands should
simultaneously be viewed as a political and economic project within the
current globalizing agrifood system.
Of course, land reform in South Africa and Namibia rightly has a
substantial amount of political currency among the vast majority of the
population due to the persistence of extremely inequitable landholdings.
However, land reform alone will not solve some of the bigger issues facing
Southern Africa. Tackling increasing inequality, especially in Botswana,
Namibia, and South Africa, and the problem of rural and urban poverty
throughout the region will require a much more integrated approach
than simply focusing on land reform and land tenure (O’Laughlin et al.
2013). Nor should it be assumed that improved land tenure equates
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with increased agricultural production, as Ferguson (2013) argues rural
people use lands in a variety of ways only one of which is for agricultural
production.
Gender
Women form a substantial percentage of smallholders in Southern Africa.
They tend to face constraints similar to the larger smallholder population in terms of maintaining food security and incomes (FAO 2013).
Constraints include lack of: secure land tenure, access to adequate
financing, extension services, production inputs (e.g., genetic diversity,
fertilizer), and up-to-date technology and training (see Ransom and Bain
2011). However, women tend to experience these constraints more deeply
and “as a result it is far more difficult for rural women than for rural men
to reach their full potential as farmers and livestock keepers” (FAO 2013:
9). In addition, poverty continues to be concentrated within rural areas,
with the poorest and most vulnerable disproportionally being “young,
female and black” (O’Laughlin et al. 2013: 2).
Small ruminants (goats and sheep) are an important source of livelihoods for smallholders throughout the developing world (FAO 2013),
and women tend to be the people charged with managing them. The Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that
in Africa as a whole, goats represent about 30 percent of the ruminant
livestock and contribute about 17 percent of the continent’s meat and 12
percent of the continent’s milk (Ibid.). Among the countries in this analysis, sheep and/or goat meat rank in the top ten agricultural commodities
produced by value for all five countries (FAOSTAT 2012). However,
similar to the slaughter of cattle, men tend to oversee the slaughter and
sale of small ruminants, thereby reducing some of the potential earnings
of women. In general, there continues to be a need to focus on gender
inequality within agriculture in Southern Africa.

ALTERNATIVE PATHS FORWARD
Noticeably absent from this discussion is HIV/AIDS, especially since
the countries in this discussion have among the highest infection rates in
Southern Africa and the world. For example, Swaziland is considered to
have the highest prevalence rate, 26 percent of the population, while South
Africa is considered to have the most HIV infected people in the world,
with 5.6 million people infected, which is 17.3 percent of the population
(UNICEF 2009). While earlier studies argued that the loss of an adult

34  International political economy of agriculture and food
would be devastating to smallholder production, more recent studies suggests HIV/AIDS has not impacted smallholders as much as previously
predicted (Jayne et al. 2010; McKeever 2008). Deaths of adults are occurring, but households for the most part appear to be able to offset the loss
of the family member (see Jayne et al. 2010; McKeever 2008 for references
to recent research). Jayne et al. (2010: 1392) suggest that a better approach
might be to acknowledge that many African countries are “facing a serious
development crisis, driven by various trends – of which HIV/AIDS is but
one – which together are making smallholder livelihoods and welfare more
and more tenuous, particularly for the large percentage of smallholders
with highly constrained access to land and education.”
Sustainability of the agrifood system of Southern Africa will become
increasingly urgent due to climate change. However, adopting sustainable approaches to agrifood production is not a foregone conclusion. For
many in Southern Africa, including producers, processors, and government officials, the current economic system encourages the pursuit of
industrial production methods, which tend to be resource, particularly
water, intensive. It cannot simply be assumed that sustainable approaches
to food production will be adopted.
At present, the commercial producers in Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland,
and especially South Africa all utilize industrialized, resource intensive
agricultural models of production. Changing these models of production will prove difficult. The combination of a food insecure region and
a neoliberal global trade environment that increases uncertainty for producers can stall policy makers and producers’ willingness to experiment
with more sustainable approaches (Mather 1996). Moreover, the ongoing
negotiations between the EU and individual Southern African countries,
do not privilege more sustainable production techniques. Rather, many
of the “behind the border” issues being negotiated either maintain the
status quo, or further instantiate more industrial modes of production,
with little attention to long-term environmental suitability or the impact
on smallholders.
Furthermore, it should not be assumed that commercial or smallholder
producers are aware of or thinking strategically about the impact of
climate change on agriculture in Southern Africa. At present, there is a
lack of data about producers’ attitudes towards and knowledge about
climate change in Southern Africa. Antidotal evidence from the author’s
own research suggests that there are a range of attitudes among commercial livestock producers in Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. While
some are aware of likely changes, at least a few do not believe in climate
change, and few of the commercial livestock producers interviewed in
these three countries appear to have a strategy for dealing with drier and
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more sporadic weather patterns in the future. This lack of knowledge or
adaption strategies suggests the need for more institutional engagement,
particularly among the government ministries of agriculture and private
sector or non-governmental trade associations.
There are clearly also opportunities for working with smallholders to
pursue more sustainable production techniques. As smallholders continue
to be a sizeable portion of the population in all five countries, this would
not be an insignificant accomplishment. However, successful engagement
with smallholders will require an increased recognition of the heterogeneity of smallholders in the region. Specifically, recognizing smallholders
better positioned to adopt capital intensive projects or consider adopting
more collaborative approaches, such as hybrid models where smallholders
work with larger farmers and vertically integrated enterprises (Collier and
Dercon 2014; Mather 1996; Jayne et al. 2010). Such efforts will require not
only a renewed investment in resources, but also increases in knowledge
co-construction (e.g., Newsham and Thomas 2011), where techniques for
sustainable production are informed by the actual practices of smallholders. The institutional support for such measures will likely need to come
from collaborative arrangements between national governments, non-
governmental organizations, international donors, and smallholders.
Finally, there are opportunities for increasing urban and peri-urban
agriculture. One study conducted in Namibia found that with the increasing migration of rural people to major cities in search of work there
has been a significant increase in gardening (Dima, Ogunmokun, and
Nantanga 2002). Rural to urban migration will continue to occur in the
coming decades. Facilitating the growth of urban gardens could be one
mechanism for decreasing food insecurity in urban spaces. Some of the
challenges that would need to be dealt with in order to promote urban and
peri-urban gardening include limited access to water; a lack of regulatory
oversight, such as access to land and reporting of problems such as theft;
and a lack of extension service personnel in urban spaces. Extension personnel could assist in improving urban gardens through increased knowledge related to types of plants grown and improved growing techniques.
In sum, there are many challenges facing Southern African agriculture.
Climate change, international trade agreements, particularly with the
EU, and a large percentage of subsistence smallholders are some of the
principal issues shaping agricultural development at present. Pursuing
solutions that are sensitive to the needs and cultures of smallholders,
including women, who largely rely on communal lands, will take ingenuity and perseverance. However, without a sustained effort to engage with
the issues reviewed here, the rural populations of Southern Africa will
increasingly be vulnerable to political, economic, and climatic shocks to
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the agricultural system, and these shocks will likely have unique spillover
effects for the Southern African region (e.g., increased rural to urban
migration, added pressure on the existing welfare safety nets, growing
environmental degradation).

NOTES
1. Botha (2013: 247) claims Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) and South Africa both had
interventionist strategies in homelands, the lands upon which indigenous communities
were confined, before 1960.
2. The reasons for the high rates of inequality across the three countries are diverse, but
McKeever (2008) argues that one common reason is the reliance of each country on
mineral wealth. He argues that while mineral wealth increases the overall size of an
economy, “only a few people reap the benefits of these industries, as most workers in
most of these countries work in agriculture” (McKeever 2008: 460).
3. The AGOA was signed into law on May 18, 2000 by the US government, and initially
34 Sub-Saharan African countries were identified as eligible for the trade benefits from
AGOA. Swaziland’s AGOA status was revoked by the Obama administration in June
2014 due to concerns over governance in Swaziland. Swaziland officials are currently
appealing to the Obama administration to reconsider the revocation, scheduled to go
into effect in January 2015 (AGOA.info 2014).
4. This was also the case for women in the United States prior to the industrialization of the
poultry industry prior to World War II (Neth 1994; Sachs 1996).
5. See WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provi
sions_e.htm.
6. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland signed an interim EPA on June 4, 2009, while
Namibia initiated negotiations, but has not signed; South Africa does not qualify for an
EPA and it has its own trade agreement with the EU (see Hurt 2012).
7. This is particularly true in South Africa, where extensive deregulation of the agriculture
sector has occurred and current policies tend to favor more capital intensive operations.
8. As the next section explains, communal farmers are usually considered smallholders.
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